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Appropriate Education and Rowley 
H. RUTHERFORD TURNBULL, III 
Abstract: The Education of the Handicapped Act requires state and local educational 
agencies to provide a free, appropriate public education to all children with disabilities. 
The meaning of "appropriate" was left quite open-ended by Congress, which predicated 
"appropriateness" on compliance with state standards and a child's IEP. The Supreme 
Court's first special education case, Board v. Rowley (1982), clarified the meaning of 
"appropriate"—as did the Court's later decision, Irving I.S.D. v. Tatro (1984J—but raised 
questions about just how far the EHA requires schools to go in educating a child. This 
article analyzes Rowley's meaning for "appropriate" education and justifies the Tightness 
of that decision in terms of its impact on the education of the child and the integration of 
children who have disabilities with children who do not. 
• The legal requirement that children with 
disabilities be provided an appropriate educa-
tion originated in Pennsylvania Association 
for Retarded Chi ldren ( 1 9 7 1 , 1 9 7 2 ) , Mills 
(1972), and other cases that laid the foundation 
for the Education for All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act (P.L. 94-142) , amending Part B of 
the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) 
(20 U.S.C. Sees. , 1 4 0 1 - 1 4 6 1 ) . In the Act, Con-
gress found as a matter of fact that more than 
one half of all children with disabilities did 
not (as of 1975) receive an appropriate educa-
tion. To remedy this situation, it required 
state and local educational agencies funded 
under Part B of the EHA to provide a free, 
appropriate public education, but it did not 
adequately define "appropriate." Thus, just 
as case law required appropriateness in the 
first place, so case law was required to interpret 
Congress' intention on "appropriateness." Board 
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v. Rowley (1982), the Supreme Court's first 
special education case, defined "appropriate" 
in the context of the EHA, building on Con-
gress' own definitions and the principal means 
of appropriateness—the individualized educa-
tion program—and in the context of Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments 
of 1973, prohibiting discrimination in federally 
aided education against otherwise qualified 
handicapped people. 
DEFINITIONS OF APPROPRIATE 
EDUCATION 
There are few statutory definitions of '' appro-
priate education" in the EHA. One of them 
derives from an understanding of the EHA 
as a whole. That definition seeks to define 
appropriate education by a process that looks 
first to the child and second to the means 
by which an appropriate education is to be 
provided. It is child-centered and process-
oriented, not system-centered or result-ori-
ented; it takes account of educational " inputs , " 
not educational "outputs." 
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For example, assume a 9-year-old child is 
moderately mentally retarded and school per-
sonnel (and the parents) are concerned about 
what kind of education and what kind of 
placement is appropriate. How do they answer 
th is question? They do it by (1) enrolling the 
child; (2)making a nondiscriminatory evalua-
tion; (3) developing an individualized educa-
t ion program (IEP); (4) attempting to place 
t h e child in the least restrictive appropriate 
program; (5) seeing that, throughout this pro-
cess , the parents have access to the child's 
school records; and (6) calling a due process 
hearing, if the parents or school personnel 
wish to protest the placement or any other 
action related to the child's right to a free 
appropriate education. The Act's technique 
for defining "appropriate," then, is to require 
that a process be followed, in the belief that 
a fair process wil l produce an acceptable 
result—an appropriate education. 
The regulations implementing the EHA 
also define free appropriate education for 
special education and related services in terms 
of state education agency standards and con-
formity with IEPs. Specifically, the regulations 
define free appropriate public education as 
one that (1) is provided at public expense, 
under public direction and supervision, with-
out charge; (2) meets the standards of the 
state education agency; (3) includes preschool, 
elementary, and secondary school education; 
and (4) is provided in conformity with IEP 
requirements of the EHA and its regulations. 
The regulations under Section 504 provide 
a third way to define appropriate education. 
They require schools to furnish children with 
special education and related aids and services 
designed to meet their educational needs as 
adequately as the needs of nonhandicapped 
children are met (an equivalency definition). 
T h e program must be based on least restrictive 
placement principles and include a full and 
individual preplacement evaluation, a nondis-
criminatory evaluation, annual revaluat ion 
of special education placement, and procedural 
due process. Implementing an IEP is one way 
to provide an appropriate education, but Sec-
tion 504 regulations do not require an IEP. 
Like the EHA, however, Section 504 addresses 
the requirement of appropriate or individual-
ized education by requiring that schools follow 
a process. Unlike the language of the EHA 
and its regulations, Section 504 requires equiv-
alency in education between handicapped 
and nonhandicapped students. 
Given the EHA's process of definition of 
appropriate education, the state standards and 
IEP definition in the EHA regulations, the 
comparability definition of the Sect ion 504 
regulations, and the further requirement in 
both that an appropriate education must be 
in the least restrictive environment (LRE), it 
was clear at the outset that courts would be 
called on to further clarify appropriate educa-
tion and its relationship to the least restrictive 
environment requirement. For the purpose 
of explaining the courts' interpretations here, 
it is not necessary to consider the LRE cases 
and their impact on the meaning of appropriate 
education. Here, it will be useful to consider 
only how courts have interpreted the other 
definitions of appropriate education, bearing 
in mind the LRE rule. 
HISTORY OF ROWLEY 
The Rowley decision (Board v. Rowley, 1982) 
has become the touchstone for all subsequent 
appropriate education cases. More than that, 
it also incorporated much of the reasoning 
and results of prior appropriate education 
cases decided by other courts and, as such, 
has na t iona l i m p l i c a t i o n s . Its h i s t o r y and 
principles, therefore, are worthy of c lose exam-
ination. 
In Rowley, a federal district court and the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals both held 
that a school district must provide a sign 
language interpreter in the classroom as part 
of a deaf chi ld 's individualized education 
program in order to comply with requirements 
of the E H A . T h e c o u r t s f o u n d t h a t , as a 
matter of law, a child's education must be 
comparable to that given nonhandicapped 
children, not the best education available. 
Under the facts in this case, they found that 
comparability would not be achieved without 
an interpreter. 
The court of appeals noted that the decision 
was restricted to the facts of this case (the 
child's parents were also deaf, and evidence 
at the trial showed that, without an interpreter, 
only 59% of what transpired in the classroom 
was accessible to the child). One judge filed 
a lengthy dissent, citing the extensive efforts 
the school district had already made on behalf 
of the child. 
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T h e Supreme Court reversed the court of 
a p p e a l s , holding that the EHA does not require 
t h e s c h o o l to provide the student with an 
in terpre ter in order to comply with the man-
date of an appropriate education. The Court 
e m p h a s i z e d the EHA legislative history. As 
t h e Court read that history, it concluded that 
C o n g r e s s had not intended that the schools 
t r y t o develop to their maximum children 
w h o are disabled. Instead, the EHA's purpose 
w a s bas ica l ly to open the schools ' doors to 
t h e m , granting them access to educational 
oppor tuni t i e s . Accordingly, congressional in-
t e n t is satisfied when the school provides the 
s t u d e n t with a reasonable opportunity to learn. 
B e c a u s e the student in this case had pro-
g r e s s e d from grade to grade without an inter-
p r e t e r ' s help, there was evidence of the school's 
c o m p l i a n c e with the "open doors" intent of 
C o n g r e s s . In t h i s a s p e c t of the c a s e , the 
C o u r t , r e l y i n g to a great e x t e n t on EHA 
l e g i s l a t i v e history, essentially adopted the com-
p a r a b i l i t y standard (the Section 504 approach). 
If t h e open doors rule were not adopted (i.e., 
i f c omparab le treatment were not required), 
t h e " m a x i m u m development" purpose would 
b e a p p r o p r i a t e ( i .e . , the EHA would have 
b e e n read to require the chi ld 's maximum 
d e v e l o p m e n t and, hence, an interpreter). Be-
c a u s e the interpreter was not required, the 
E H A requires only comparability. 
T h e Court also stressed the importance of 
t h e l a w ' s procedures for defining and providing 
a n appropriate education. Specifically, it noted 
t h a t a l l of the professionals involved in devel-
o p i n g the chi ld 's IEP were of the opinion 
t h a t t h e child could be educated appropriately 
w i t h o u t an interpreter. In addition, it pointed 
o u t t h e many ways in which the law allows 
t h e c h i l d ' s parents to be involved in the IEP 
p r o c e s s and otherwise. 
IMPACT OF ROWLEY 
T h e Rowley decision undoubtedly is quite 
l i m i t e d by its facts as precedent for other 
c a s e s . For example, because the student was 
i n a r e g u l a r c lass , it is doubtful that the 
C o u r t ' s emphasis on grade-to-grade promotion 
w o u l d apply to c h i l d r e n with disabi l i t ies 
w h o d o not or cannot progress from grade 
t o g r a d e in the mainstream or whose progress 
c a n n o t be measured by that standard. It also 
i s d o u b t f u l whether the decision would apply 
to children who require related services in 
order to be educated in the mainstream, such 
as the spina bifida chi ldren in the Tatro 
case (Irving I.S.D. v. Tatro, 1984). The Supreme 
Court's own Tatro decision confirmed that 
suspicion. 
But Rowley's implications—the principle 
of comparability and the Court's reliance on 
professionalism and process—is great. Some 
of the cases summarized in the following 
paragraphs reflect Rowley's impact. 
Principle of Comparability 
The first of Rowley's principles is that the 
EHA was designed only to provide to children 
with disabilities the same basic opportunities 
for a meaningful education as nondisabled 
children have. Opening the school doors so 
that the former have reasonable opportunities 
to learn, but not assuring them an opportunity 
to reach their maximum potential, was consid-
ered to be Congress' intent, nothing more. 
Rowley thus addressed the goal of an educa-
tion, not just how that goal is to be reached 
(e.g., with or without an interpreter). 
The IEP 
Second, it is clear that another of Rowley's 
tenets is that individualized education pro-
grams, developed by a team of professionals 
and parents, are deemed to be appropriate. 
That proposition flies squarely in the face of 
legislative judgments, usually based on fiscal 
policy, that a school year should be limited 
to a fixed number of days a year. Although 
fiscally and politically defensible, that decision 
does not satisfy the Rowley demand for in-
dividualization of education, based on pro-
fessional judgment. 
Year-Round Education 
It was therefore predictable that inf lexible 
school year limits would be tested on behalf 
of children with disabilities. On 12 -month 
education, the leading case is Armstrong v. 
Klein (1980) . In that case, the federal district 
court held that the state's refusal to pay for 
more than 180 days of schooling each year 
for children who are severely and profoundly 
retarded and severely emotionally disturbed 
violated their rights to an appropriate educa-
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tion under the EHA. The court ruled that an 
appropriate education is one that allows the 
children to become self-sufficient within the 
limits of their disabilities, not just one that 
allows them to share equally in programs 
provided to nonhandicapped students or to 
reach one of several other goals. The court 
also noted that some children regress signif-
icantly during breaks in their education, recoup 
their losses more slowly than nonhandicapped 
children, and thus are denied an appropriate 
education when they are not given year-round 
education. 
Appropriate Education as Process 
Third, Rowley affirmed the process definition 
of appropriate education. Enroll the child, 
evaluate, do an IEP, and place him or her 
in the least restrictive environment. That cer-
tainly seems consistent with the scheme of 
the EHA. Of course it often begs the question 
of substance: Does the process yield a pro-
fessionally acceptable result that parents also 
adopt? 
Related Services 
Fourth, Rowley came to the Court as an 
appropriate education case~ in the posture of 
the requirements for related services (an inter-
preter). Although the Court decided against 
the claim for an interpreter for the child, it 
did not argue with the proposition of the 
EHA that an appropriate education depends, 
in some cases, on the availability of related 
services. Indeed, the Court itself in Tatro has 
clarified one important aspect of related ser-
vices. The general issue there was how to 
distinguish between a related service and a 
medical service. The specific issue was whether 
clean intermittent catheterization (CIC) is a 
related service (under Part B of the EHA) 
that a school must provide or a medica l 
service that it is not required to provide 
except for diagnostic or evaluation purposes. 
Federal trial and appeals courts had held 
that CIC is a related service. The Supreme 
Court affirmed, holding in an unanimous 
opinion that CIC is a related service that 
schools must provide. 
In Tatro, the Supreme Court found as a 
matter of fact that CIC is a "simple procedure 
. . . that may be performed in a few minutes 
by a l a y p e r s o n w i t h less than an hour 's 
training/' Indeed, the student herself soon 
would be able to perform the service, as her 
parents, babysitters, and teenage brother had 
been doing all along. 
The Court was faced with the legal issue 
whether CIC is a related service under the 
EHA (Sec. 1401 [7]). To decide that, it had to 
determine whether CIC is a "supportive ser-
vice" required to "assist a handicapped child 
to benefit from special education" and, next, 
whether CIC is excluded from the supportive 
service def in i t ion because it is a medica l 
service serving purposes other than diagnosis 
or evaluation. 
The Court held that CIC is a related service 
because, without it, the student could not 
attend school and thereby benefit from special 
education. Congress' intent, said the Court 
(relying on its earlier decision in Rowley), 
was to make a public education available and 
to make access to school meaningful. A service 
that makes it possible for the child to "remain 
at school during the day is an important 
means of providing the child with the meaning-
ful access to education that Congress envi-
s ioned." It is clear that the Court was not 
about to allow any violation of the zero-reject 
principle by permitting schools to escape the 
obligation of this type of related service. It 
also is apparent that the Court was concerned 
that children have an opportunity for meaning-
ful access. Its concern with prohibiting func-
tional exclusion is apparent, too. And the 
Court may have been concerned with exclusion 
of the student from education with nondis-
abled students, although it did not refer to 
the LRE principle. 
Next, the Court found that CIC is not a 
medical service that the school must provide 
for diagnosis or evaluation. There are two 
reasons for this conclusion. First, the Court 
deferred to the Department of Education regu-
lations, which ruled CIC to be a related, not 
a medical, service. Second, the Court found 
that Congress plainly required schools to hire 
various specially trained personnel and that 
school nurses have long been a part of educa-
tional systems. It also noted that nurses have 
authority to dispense oral medication and to 
administer emergency injections and that it 
is diff icult to dis t inguish CIC from these 
services. 
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Psychotherapy as a Related Service 
H o w far should the related services require-
m e n t extend? Specifically, does the related 
s e r v i c e s requirement apply to psychotherapy? 
S e v e r a l of the dispositive facts in Tatro and 
its h o l d i n g that CIC is a related service are 
not p r e s e n t in cases involving psychotherapy. 
F o r e x a m p l e , trained laypersons can perform 
CIC. I n d e e d , CIC can be self-administered. 
B y contras t , psychotherapy can be performed 
l a w f u l l y and competently (it is presumed) 
o n l y b y l icensed physicians with special train-
ing a n d qualification in psychiatry. Rarely it 
is self-administered in the Tatro sense of the 
p a t i e n t and professional being one and the 
s a m e person. 
I n addit ion, the cost of CIC is relatively 
l o w , a n d its benefits to the child (enhanced 
o p p o r t u n i t y for life and for education, particu-
l a r l y w i t h nondisabled children) are great. 
T h e cost-benefit ratio favors CIC and disfavors 
s c h o o l s ' objections to providing it. On the 
o t h e r h a n d , the cost-benefit ratio does not 
favor psychotherapy as a related service that 
s c h o o l districts must either pay for (so others 
c a n prov ide it) or provide themselves. 
In The Matter of the "A" Family (1979) 
is a state court decision holding that out-of-
s tate p lacement in a private residential facility 
for ser ious ly emotionally disturbed children, 
at w h i c h the child would receive psycho-
t h e r a p y , is placement in the least restrictive 
a l te rnat ive for the chi ld, and that costs of the 
t u i t i o n and the therapy must be paid by a 
l o c a l s c h o o l district under the EHA's provision 
for re la ted services. Psychotherapy is a related 
s e r v i c e , not a medical service, because it is 
a " t r e a t m e n t of mental or emotional disorders 
or o f r e l a t e d bodi ly i l ls by psychologica l 
m e a n s , " according to Webster's New Collegiate 
Dictionary. It thus comes within the definition 
of psychologica l services. 
O t h e r cases also tend to be expansive and 
l ibera l about psychotherapy, usually in the 
c o n t e x t of residential hospitalization (as con-
t ras ted with school-based special education 
a n d psychotherapy as a related service). Thus 
Gladys J . v. Pearland Independent School 
District ( 1 9 8 1 ) and KrueJ le v. New Castle 
County School District (1981) both held that 
an appropriate education for severely emotion-
a l ly disturbed children includes psychotherapy 
a n d 24-hour , 12-month residential placement. 
O t h e r cases concur in this result, holding 
that school nurses' and physicians' charges 
at a residential facility should be paid by the 
school district that placed the child there 
since the physicians' charges are for evalua-
tions and diagnostic and prescriptive services, 
not treatment. 
Similarly, in Gary B. v. Cronin (1982), the 
plaintiffs were emotionally disturbed children 
challenging a state rule that excludes counsel-
ing and therapeutic services from special 
education services. The court issued a prelim-
inary injunction preventing implementation 
of the rule that would deny money for counsel-
ing and therapy and a free appropriate educa-
tion to the plaintiff. 
By contrast, McKenzie v. Jefferson (1983) 
held that the residential component of a 
psychiatric hospital placement is medical, 
not educational, in nature and is not to be 
paid for by a school district, because it is 
not a related service. A concurring case is 
Darlene L. v. Illinois State Board of Education 
(1983). 
SUMMARY 
In my judgment, the Supreme Court's Tatro 
decision was correctly decided and its princi-
ples are sound, with regard to the behavior 
and functions of schools and with regard to 
both values and principles. The same is true, 
I believe, of the 12-month school year cases 
and Rowley. These cases build on the process 
definition, although with too much reliance 
in the language of the Court in Rowley on 
school-based professionals' opinion (perhaps 
justified in that case in light of the student's 
academic progress). They keep the IEP as the 
focal point of appropriateness. They adhere 
to the comparability standard, although with 
great effort in the 12-month school year and 
psychotherapy cases. They recognize the neces-
sity of related services for appropriateness. 
And they emphasize the child's right to and 
need for an appropriate (beneficial) education. 
In these respects schools' behaviors and func-
tions are properly required to be child-centered 
and appropriately individualized. 
But these cases also seem correct because 
they adopt the correct (integrative) values and 
principles of education (both regular and 
special). All of these cases seem to emphasize 
the need for integration of students who have 
disabilities with students who do NOT. Tatro 
required catheterization so that the student 
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could continue her education at school (instead 
of home). The 12-month school year cases 
seem to say that the extended school year is 
required so some children can continue to 
receive educat ional services at all ; in the 
absence of summer schooling, they may regress 
so much that it would be pointless to require 
schools to educate them at all. And Rowley 
made much of the fact that the student was 
integrated with nondisabled students and pass-
ing from grade to grade. 
In these cases, the principle that schools 
must provide certain services is associated 
with the value of integration. The cases thus 
require a relatively new behavior of schools 
—appropriate education (i.e., the opposite of 
funct iona l exc lus ion) . And the cases also 
require a relatively new function of schools—to 
take on some of the responsibilities of other 
agencies. The value is integration. The objec-
tive is to prevent exclusion. 
Just how far the courts will pursue these 
behavior-shaping and function-changing prin-
ciples and values remains to be seen. The 
decisive test may be the psychotherapy cases. 
There, the courts may take into account the 
costs of school-provided therapy, the drastic 
change of role from providing education to 
practicing medicine, the length of time re-
quired for successful intervention, the pro-
fessional qualifications required of the pro-
vider, and the comparability requirements of 
the EHA (as interpreted in Rowley and as 
seen under the "reasonable accommodations" 
test of Southeastern Community College v. 
Davis [1979]). 
In considering any one of these factors, 
and especially in considering a combination 
of them, the courts may dec ide that the 
integration principle should yield to consider-
ations of cost, time, and professionalism and 
should be modified because the child could 
receive more effective individualized services 
in other service systems. In this event, the 
child arguably would not be denied an appro-
priate education (since the psychiatric and 
possibly educational services would still be 
provided by other agencies) but would receive 
them in a less integrated setting (e.g., in a 
psychiatric hospital). 
Indeed, that result—exclusion from school-
based services and inclusion in other service 
providers' systems for receipt of special educa-
tion and related services—is a major issue of 
the EHA's requirements for least restrictive 
alternatives or environments (LRA/LRE). 
To the extent (which is not sufficient) that 
courts use the LRA principle and other EHA 
provisions to create new programs of appropri-
ate education within the schools, the appropri-
ate education rule (individualization) and the 
appropriate education value (integration) ad-
vance each other and continue to attack vestiges 
of a dual system of education. To the extent 
(which is too frequent), however, that courts 
s i m p l y c h o o s e b e t w e e n one program and 
another (e.g., school-based or institution-based), 
they abjure appropriateness and integration 
as a combined goal and adhere only to ap-
propriateness as a single goal. There is enough 
i n Rowley, Tatro, and the 12-month school-
year cases—enough about the value of integra-
t ion—to make strong arguments for the com-
b i n e d approach (appropriateness and integra-
t i o n ) . In the end, that approach, indirectly 
advanced in Rowley, may be Rowley's greatest 
contribution. 
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